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Searching for ‘the political’ in environmental politics 
 
The terrain of environmental politics has changed profoundly in recent years. Due to a 
mainstreaming of the green question, environmental discourse has shifted to favouring 
cooperation over conflict and to focussing on managerial, individualised, technical and 
market-oriented measures. The result of this shift is a form of depoliticisation or post-politics. 
Drawing on recent debates in political theory, this article first investigates the peculiar ways in 
which ‘the political’ both manifests itself and becomes concealed in the context of 
environmentalism, and shows why this question is particularly vulnerable to depoliticisation. 
Second, it seeks new avenues for repoliticisation, going beyond existing approaches to do so, 
which often tend to reduce the political to the social or, equally, to a normative position. The 
paper concludes by showing how the same characteristics that make the environmental 
question liable to depoliticisation, can turn it, under certain conditions, into a field of 
politicisation par excellence. 
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Introduction 
An important shift has taken place over the last decade with regard to the environmental 
question. As a result of rising consciousness about climate change, this question has been 
made more central to the agenda than ever before. This has profoundly changed the terrain of 
environmental politics. While being green was, for a long time, the concern of a small, but 
growing minority at the fringes of the political spectrum, the green cause has recently gained 
momentum. Many ideological currents and political and social actors that were formerly 
situated outside the green scene are attempting to appropriate the issue, to give it a particular 
content and to profile themselves as green: from green liberalism à la Al Gore, via Richard 
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Branson’s ‘Gaia capitalism,’ to Thomas Friedman’s Green Revolution (Dale 2008, Friedman 
2008, Foster et al. 2010, p. 430). At the same time, many NGO’s are seeing significant 
opportunities for mainstreaming their concerns, for example, through forms of collaboration 
with big corporations: after so many years of opposing and criticising the latter, NGO’s are 
picking up on the idea that they can change corporations from the inside.  
The appearance of new actors on the environmental scene and of new types of 
thinking about the environmental question challenges us to rethink the terrain of 
environmental politics. One peculiar characteristic of many of the newer variants of 
environmentalism is their tendency to dismiss conflict in favour of all-round cooperation. This 
trend is often buttressed by a sharp awareness of the urgency of the environmental threat and 
by the apocalyptic imaginary that this triggers (Swyngedouw 2010a). As Tony Blair points 
out, ‘(g)lobal warming is too serious for the world any longer to ignore its danger or split into 
opposing factions on it’1. People from a more progressive background also underline this need 
for urgent ‘common’ action. Susan George, a well-known co-founder of Attac and president 
of the Transnational Institute, echoed Blair’s sentiment, stating at a conference held in the 
Netherlands that, ‘Time is short, we therefore have to think bigger. 2 A couple of years ago 
you would not have heard me saying this, but I think we should involve the enlightened spirits 
amongst the entrepreneurs’. George therefore argues for a broad alliance based on a ‘minimal 
consensus’ around ‘saving the planet’.  
Many others have made similar and even more far-reaching statements about the need 
to leave behind supposedly outdated conflicts in order to make formerly unusual types of 
cooperation possible. Rob Hopkins (2008, p. 141), founder of the Transition Towns 
movement, argues: ‘The scale of the challenge of peak oil and climate change cannot be 
addressed […] if ‘green’ people only talk to other ‘green’ people, business people only talk to 
other business people, and so on’. Confronted with the urgency and scale of the climate 
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change threat, we would no longer have the luxury to engage in time-consuming conflicts and 
struggles that only hamper the cooperative action that is so needed now. For this reason, 
consensus-seeking and all-round collaboration are advocated as efficacious alternatives. 
In many instances, this type of discourse goes together with a focus on technical, 
managerial, market-oriented and individualised measures, which are defended in slightly 
moral terms and unilaterally stress ‘good governance’. Take, for example, the discourse on 
sustainable consumption. Not only does it suggest that climate change is the result of the 
simple sum of individual environmentally unfriendly behaviours, but it also tends to depict 
the individual footprint in market and/or moralistic terms (Courtenay-Hall and Rogers 2002, 
Clover 2002, Jensen 2002). According to the sustainable consumption paradigm, we can buy 
ourselves out of the crisis by becoming conscious of the right and wrong (consumer) 
behaviours that ‘we’ as individuals display, thus assuming specific forms of guilt and duty. 
Another telling example is emissions trading, an extremely sophisticated, technical and 
managerial system that attempts to put a price on the right to emit a ton of CO2 (Stephan and 
Paterson 2012). In line with the current market paradigm, not only are carbon markets created, 
but even carbon stock exchanges, carbon rating agencies and all kind of carbon derivatives 
such as ‘options’ and ‘futures’ (Bond 2012, Stephan and Paterson 2012). We will further 
elaborate upon this example below, and show how it constitutes a typical example of post-
politics. Other examples of this technical and managerial approach include the belief in 
carbon capture and storage, nuclear energy, geo-engineering and corporate social 
responsibility. 
These forms of managerialism and technocracy, the focus on individual, moral and 
market-oriented measures, and the stress on cooperation rather than conflict are all 
manifestations of a profound tendency towards ‘depoliticisation’ or ‘post-politics’ that 
permeates environmentalism today (Swyngedouw 2007). As will be explained further in this 
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article, the effect of this tendency is to render power, conflict and decision invisible and to 
conceal the contingency of current society. Consequently, we lose sight of the specific socio-
economic structures underlying environmental disasters and the conflicts and decisions 
related to these structures. Furthermore, by presenting technical, market-oriented or 
individualised measures as neutral, one tends to conceal, in turn, their effects on society and 
on the existing distribution of power. The point of the matter is that when society is no longer 
recognised as having a specific, socially constructed relation with ‘nature’, the space for a real 
discussion on the root causes of the environmental crisis, and thus on effective solutions, 
dramatically shrinks. This can undermine not only the effectiveness of environmental policies, 
but especially their democratic character. The diagnosis of today’s environmental question as 
being depoliticised is not only important as such, it also triggers more fundamental questions 
concerning environmental politics. Indeed, one can ask the question: where, if at all, is ‘the 
political’ in ‘environmental politics’?3 There is a lot of debate and research on the 
characteristics, merits and transformations of existing environmental politics, but far less on 
what ‘politics’ or ‘the political’ exactly means in environmental affairs. As will be argued in 
this article, with regard to environmental affairs, ‘the political’ manifests itself in very specific 
and peculiar ways. 
In the next section, we will try to uncover what ‘the political’ in ‘environmental 
politics’ can mean, and we will defend the thesis that there is indeed a problem of 
depoliticisation in the environmental question. We will then move on, in the third section, to 
pinpoint the crucial determinants at play in the environmental question that make it much 
more vulnerable to depoliticisation than other important topical issues. The focus of the 
article, however, is how we can find possible sources of (re)politicisation. Surveying the 
literature on post-politics in environmental affairs, it seems to be much easier to diagnose 
depoliticisation than to provide effective suggestions for overcoming it, even though the latter 
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is imperative if we are to find effective and democratic answers to the environmental crisis. 
We will show that insofar as attempts at repoliticisation are made, they often assume a social 
subject (e.g. the ‘excluded’) and a normative principle (e.g. equality), on the basis of which a 
political space can be created. We argue that this approach narrows the scope of what ‘the 
political’ can mean in the environmental domain, and unduly limits ‘the political’ to actions 
and discourses which have a normative or emancipatory basis. In this article, therefore, we 
aim at developing a more sober conception of the political and of repoliticisation, which not 
only avoids reducing the environmental question to a social one, but also tries to circumvent 
any normative a priori. These steps are of crucial importance for thinking how the 
environmental question can be addressed democratically. 
In order to rethink the conditions for repoliticising the environmental question, we will 
point in the fourth section to a paradox that is present in the diagnosis that current 
environmental discourse is depoliticised. Indeed, the very way in which this diagnosis is 
commonly formulated risks obscuring our vision of potential pathways towards 
repoliticisation. This analysis will open the way to begin thinking politicisation anew. In the 
fifth section, we will show that, in an interesting way, the same characteristics that make the 
environmental question so liable to depoliticisation, can turn it, under certain conditions, into 
a field of politicisation par excellence, understood as a scene composed of a multiplicity 
positions whose conflictual or power relations can become visible and contestable. The 
appearance of such a scene, we argue, is of crucial importance for environmental democracy. 
 
Post-politics 
In his book Climate Change and Society, John Urry (2011, p. 90) takes issue with the thesis 
that we have entered a post-political era. There is a ‘range of different politics surrounding 
changing climates’, he states, referring as an example to direct protests such as climate camps, 
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which sharply critique capitalism as being one of the root causes of climate change. He points 
out that the public debate about climate change displays a variety of approaches and answers, 
and concludes that it is ‘hard to argue that this huge array of different arguments is all ‘post-
political’’ (Urry 2011, p. 93). 
Urry is arguably right when he questions overly generalised depictions of the present 
as ‘post-political’; however,  when he suggests that post-politics is not an issue at all, he tends 
to miss what is truly at stake. Urry argues that the multiplicity of actors putting forward 
different analyses and answers to climate change proves that the environmental scene is (still) 
highly politicised. Contemporary political theorists, such as Claude Lefort (1988a) or Chantal 
Mouffe (2006), would argue that the presence of this multiplicity is evident: the social is 
always torn by conflict, division and the exercise of power. The question of post-politics 
involves something more: it concerns whether or not the discourses through which the social 
is interpreted account for these realities – i.e., conflict, division and power - and make them 
visible. That is what depoliticisation is about.  
In order to understand what is at stake, it is important to heed a distinction made by 
many contemporary political theorists (see Lefort 1988b, Schmitt 1996, Rancière 1999, 
Mouffe 2006, Marchart 2007): the distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. Leaving 
aside important differences for the moment, we can say that many authors understand 
‘politics’ as referring to the conventional notion of politics as a differentiated sphere within 
society which is centred around the state. ‘The political’, in contrast, has a broader scope in 
that it refers to a symbolic or discursive order which represents the social in a particular way: 
bluntly speaking, ‘the political’ is a discourse that acknowledges conflict, division and power. 
Carl Schmitt (1996) was the first author to draw this distinction4. In his famous book, 
The Concept of the Political, he argues that the political cannot be defined in terms of the 
state, as it usually is, but that the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political 
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(Schmitt 1996, p. 19). The latter, therefore, needs its own criterion, which, according to 
Schmitt, is the distinction between friend and enemy. Schmitt coins his concept of the 
political in order to think depoliticisation, which he sees as the result of discourses or 
symbolisations that conceal conflicts, decisions, power or the contingency of social order. 
(Re)politicisation consists, then, of openly declaring and disclosing friend/enemy distinctions.  
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, Mouffe 2006) have 
argued that every social objectivity is hegemonically constituted; according to them,  there is 
no social relation which is not the product of power. Each hegemonic constitution of the 
social also entails certain exclusions, which can generate forms of antagonism. 
Depoliticisation occurs, then, when the exercise of hegemonic power and the antagonisms that 
result from it are covered up. Claude Lefort (1986, 1988b), in his turn, argues that society 
does not have a spontaneous self-understanding, but always needs to be interpreted and 
symbolised. The political, in his view, is the symbolic order through which the social is 
interpreted, and therefore symbolically instituted. This interpretation or representation 
generates a constitutive split in society: a division between representation and that which is 
represented. The loss of the political occurs in forms of ideology which do not recognise this 
division and the conflict that it can provoke.  
Jacques Rancière (1999, 2007) distinguishes between ‘politics’ and ‘police’, arguing 
that political action is about making something visible that was previously invisible, or 
making certain unheard voices audible, in opposition to a (post-political, one could say) 
managerial police logic which suggests there is nothing to see or hear beyond the dominant 
discourse. Specific to Ranière’s approach is that he seems to give the political act a normative 
content: a political act always happens under the assumption of the equality of each and every 
one, which makes it possible to reveal the police order as inegalitarian, but also as contingent. 
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Even though political action always springs from a particular grief or demand, it always has a 
universal dimension due to its egalitarian assumption.  
Although they do not assume a normative standpoint in order to think politicisation, 
Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau 1996, Butler et al. 2000, Laclau and Mouffe 2001) have also 
stressed the importance of universality, even though they conceive of it differently. They 
argue that politicisation occurs when a series of demands or griefs (which demands or griefs is 
a contingent matter) is equivalentially inscribed in a counterhegemonic discourse. In this 
process one demand comes to stand for the whole, thereby acquiring a universalizing thrust. 
The signifier that expresses this demand and becomes the nodal point in a discourse is 
tendentially emptied of its particular content to the extent that it comes to stand for a whole 
series of equivalential demands.  
Slavoj Žižek (2000) has strongly relied on both the work of Rancière and that of 
Laclau and Mouffe to coin his notion of post-politics. According to Žižek, a situation 
becomes politicised when a ‘particular demand starts to function as a metaphoric 
condensation of the global opposition against them, those in power, so that the protest is no 
longer actually just about that demand, but about the universal dimension that resonates in 
that particular demand’ (Žižek 2000, p. 204). Post-politics, in contrast, is when this us/them 
distinction disappears:  
‘In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which 
compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, 
public opinion specialists...) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of 
interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus’ (Žižek 
2000, p. 198).  
What remains invisible in post-politics is the fact that a social order is fundamentally 
contingent, and that grounding a social order always generates exclusions, and therefore, 
antagonisms.  
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It is beyond the scope of this article to render the conceptual sophistication of these 
articulations of the difference between politics and the political and of the notion of 
depoliticisation that can be inferred from them. What is important to stress for the purpose of 
this article is that, in these different political theories, the political is each time of a symbolic 
nature, and entails a discourse that recognises and makes visible the reality of conflict, power 
and the contingency of a decision. The point of the matter is that if society is no longer 
understood as divided and liable to be contested and changed through political means, this 
undermines its democratic nature in a fundamental way (Lefort 1988b). Indeed, these political 
theorists have in common an understanding that democracy requires a discourse that 
recognizes and makes visible (and contestable) the contingency of current society, the power 
that institutes it and the exclusions or conflicts that this can generate (Lefort 1988b, Rancière 
1999, Mouffe 2000, Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Post-politics or depoliticisation operates 
precisely through the concealment or misrecognition of these essential features of society. 
Democracy is before all else the form of society that acknowledges that it does not have an 
ultimate foundation, and that it is characterised by indeterminacy and contingency.  
All these approaches take part in what has been called ‘post-foundational political 
theory’ (Marchart 2007). This theoretical strand argues that there is no ultimate foundation to 
the social while at the same time acknowledging that the social always requires some ground. 
Founding the social is at the same time unattainable and inevitable: without any foundation, 
the social would not exist, however, providing a final foundation is impossible. ‘The 
political’, then, refers to the always provisional and contingent foundation of social order and 
to the recognition of this contingency.  
John Urry (2011) seems to have misunderstood this symbolic or discursive nature of 
the political, and therefore fails to appreciate what is at stake in the discussion on post-
politics. This is most obvious when he speaks about the Transition Towns movement as being 
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‘significantly political since it challenges the sedimented systems of twentieth-century carbon 
capitalism’ (Urry 2011, p. 92). While it is true that the movement advocates a kind of radical 
change in local communities, this is not sufficient to make it genuinely political. Indeed, the 
movement’s stress on consensus-seeking, all-round cooperation and the psychology of 
change, as well as its aversion to conflict and its blindness to power relations in fact qualify it 
as precisely post-political (Kenis and Mathijs 2009).  
Even though the diagnosis of the present era as post-political might seem to do 
injustice to many forms of opposition and resistance that attempt to repoliticise, the critique of 
the post-political nature of the hegemonic environmental discourse appears valid. Of course, 
there might be disagreement among international negotiators during UN summits about 
whether emissions trading rather than a carbon tax is the best suitable measure for putting a 
price on carbon, or about the specific techniques emissions trading should make use of. But, 
being largely of a technical and managerial nature, this is not the kind of conflict or debate 
which makes the fundamental political principles in terms of which our society is instituted or 
organised visible and therefore contestable.  
 
The environment 
Post-politics seems to be especially persistent in the environmental field. In this section, we 
will try to bring out some of the features of the environmental question which make it so 
liable to depoliticisation. This evidently brings us to question the notion of the ‘environment’ 
itself; as we will see, the meaning of this term does not lend itself to easy determination. As 
Noel Castree (2005, p. 8) argues, everyone will consider trees, butterflies or hurricanes to be 
part of ‘nature’ or the ‘environment’. In their commonplace definitions, the ‘environment’ and 
‘nature’ refer to the non-human world. However, a deeper examination swiftly shows that 
bounds are not that easy to demarcate. Castree gives the examples of Occidental’s former 
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Canvey Island site (the oil refinery that Occidental had started to build there in the 70s 
remained unused and unpolluted; decades later it has turned into one of the most biodiverse 
sites of Western Europe) and biotechnical labs. Do these still belong to the ‘environment’, are 
they still ‘nature’, or not? Furthermore, as Castree (2005, p. 8) indicates, if one looks a little 
further, nature encompasses humans as well: ‘(a)t some level, our biological capacities 
condition what we are able to do at all stages of our lives. In this sense, nature is always 
already here – intimately a part of us – not just somewhere else or beyond us’. This presence 
of nature in the human is clear in day-to-day experience and discourse, from the so-called 
hormonal pre-menstrual mood swings to the blood ties between parent and child.  
So much is clear: ‘nature continues to be understood in a multitude of ways, many of 
them incompatible’ (Castree 2005, p. xvii ). Still, the term ‘environment’ suggests we are 
talking about something unambiguous, something ‘out there’, something that surrounds us. 
This connotation does not appear out of thin air. It corresponds to the way ‘nature’ tends to be 
externalised in contemporary society (Fitzsimmons 1989). This is not a neutral gesture. Social 
processes underlying environmental phenomena risk being obscured in this way: think for 
example about the floods in Pakistan or the drought in Moscow in the summer of 2010. 
Should we consider them mere ‘environmental’ disasters? Or think about the hurricane 
Katrina: imagine that there would have been a better preparation (reinforcement work on the 
levees, evacuation of people at the announcement of the hurricane, targeted intervention after 
the hurricane), large parts of the disaster could then have been avoided. To what extent can 
we still speak of an ‘environmental disaster’ (Žižek 2009b, p. 80)? These examples show how 
difficult it is to draw clear lines of distinction. ‘Nature’ and ‘society’ are often inextricably 
linked. Misrecognising this link and externalising nature can be a royal road to 
depoliticisation. 
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It could be argued that exactly this discursive separation of nature from society, this 
lack of reference to social relations in environmental discourses, leads to the depoliticisation 
of the environmental question. From another perspective, this suggests that if we want to 
repoliticise the environmental question, we should connect it again with social issues: they are 
often more divisive and can therefore become more easily politicised by linking them up with 
an emancipatory discourse on equality, for example. Both Erik Swyngedouw (2010a) and 
Slavoj Žižek (2008) suggest such a way out of post-politics.  
In several of his articles, Swyngedouw (2010a, 2007, 2009) argues that one of the 
reasons why the environmental question is so easily depolicitised is because it lacks a 
reference to a clear subject of change. According to him, this distinguishes the environmental 
crisis from the problems tackled by ‘social’ movements, such as feminism, the civil rights 
movement or the labour movement. In these movements, the subject of oppression, struggle 
and change is easily identified: indeed, women, African-Americans or workers, respectively, 
are among the first to speak out about what is wrong and what needs to happen in order for 
change to be realised. It is when these subjects appropriate democratic or emancipatory 
language (e.g., egalitarian discourse) that a space can arise in which the political is made 
visible.   
Swyngedouw is not alone in focusing on the role of subject positions in processes of 
policitisation and depoliticisation. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) have equally argued that ‘social’ 
movements bring new subjectivities to the fore that can politicise social relations or spaces 
which were not previously considered political, and through this, they can become the bearers 
of a process of radicalisation of democracy beyond the narrow confines of the state. Similarly, 
Carl Schmitt (1996) has argued that subjectivity is vital to political matters, since it is one of 
the elements that demarcate the political from morality and science. At least in the way they 
understand themselves, morality and science rely on a degree of abstraction from the speaking 
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or acting subject. Strictly speaking, moral thinking starts from the idea that it is possible to 
solve a conflict on the basis of ethical principles that somehow stand above the conflicting 
subjects. In science’s dominant self-understanding subjectivity is radically excluded5. In 
contrast, if political action and thought is about conflict, decision and the exercise of power, 
the question of the subject is unavoidable. Political affairs is the realm of subjectivity par 
excellence.  
But who is the subject that fights the environmental struggle? This is far from an easy 
question to answer. In some environmental circles, environmental disasters are portrayed as 
‘nature’s’ own revenge for human pollution, but this is a very mystifying way of speaking 
(Chase 1991). Nature does not act, take revenge, or struggle. As Castree (2005, p. xvii ) points 
out: ‘It is a truism that ‘facts never speak for themselves’. Someone has to speak about or in 
the name of nature for nature to become politically salient in the first place. Climate change 
has been taking place for many decades, but extensive scientific reports and numerous actions 
were required in order to bring visibility to the problem and to put it on the agenda. The 
environmental question only exists as a political problem to the extent that there are 
representations of it in the public sphere.  
For the most part, the environmental struggle is not framed as the emancipatory 
struggle of a particular subject, in contrast to feminism, the civil rights movement or labour 
struggle. It is about how we, or human society, relate to the planet. Since we all belong to the 
planet, everybody (or nobody?) seems to be in a position to speak in nature’s name. The 
environmental question lends itself easily to a discourse suggesting that ‘we are all in this 
together’ and that we, therefore, have to cooperate, create partnerships and reach consensus.6 
If ‘everyone together’ is the subject of the environmental question, post-politics is the evident 
result (Swyngedouw 2007).  
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Slavoj Žižek goes a step further by claiming that the repoliticisation of the 
environmental question is a matter not only of subjectivity, but of redefining the 
environmental struggle as an emancipatory one. In his article ‘Censorship Today: Violence, or 
Ecology as a New Opium for the Masses’, he describes why current society tends to be 
depoliticised and distinguishes four possible, contemporary antagonisms that could lead to 
repoliticising the present (Žižek 2008). These are, summarily: the environmental crisis, the 
inappropriateness of private property for ‘intellectual property’, new techno-scientific 
developments (especially in bio-genetics) and what he calls ‘new forms of apartheid’, or ‘new 
walls and slums’ that separate the ‘Excluded’ from the ‘Included’. After elaborating on these 
four themes, Žižek states: ‘In the series of the four antagonisms, the one between the Included 
and the Excluded is the crucial one, the point of reference for the others; without it, all others 
lose their subversive edge: ecology turns into a ‘problem of sustainable development’, 
‘intellectual property’ into a ‘complex legal challenge’, biogenetics into an ‘ethical’ issue’. In 
other words, the question of the excluded subject is the most critical one: It is the one through 
which all the other question should be approached and politicised. 
The perspective exemplified here by Žižek thus turns the environmental question into 
an emancipation struggle. However, as we will argue in the last section, such an approach is 
questionable, as it risks creating other forms of depoliticisation. It starts from a normative idea 
of what politicisation should consist of – the struggle for equality in this case. In this regard, 
Žižek’s approach is vulnerable to the critique Oliver Marchart (2007, p. 159) formulated 
against Rancière’s notion of the political, which Žižek heavily relies on. Marchart’s critique is 
that Rancière relies on an ‘emancipatory apriorism’, and in this sense restricts the scope of 
what politicisation might consist of and unduly closes the openness and contingency that is 
inherent to ‘the political’. 
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Without any doubt, there are good reasons to seek potential repoliticisation of the 
environmental question in terms of a social subject striving for equality and emancipation, 
thereby showing the intertwinement of environmental affairs and social relations. Many 
examples can be given. Think, for instance, about the indigenous people living next to tar 
sands exploitations (Nikiforuk 2008), or the inhabitants of Tuvalu who have to flee their 
homeland because of the rising sea level (FoE 2007). More than others, these people are 
affected by the environmental crisis, and one could argue that a solution to this crisis requires 
that they – in a genuinely emancipatory fashion – raise their voices and demand change.  
By focusing on the social relations that adhere to environmental destruction, one not 
only acquires a view of possible subjects of change, but one is also better able to determine 
possible objects of change. Indeed, the fact that the environmental crisis is so easily 
depoliticised should be attributed not only to the fact that there is no specific subject, but also 
to the fact that no specific object, or objects, appears as the evident focus for environmental 
solutions.7 Strictly speaking, every single social relation, practice or event has an 
environmental impact. There is hardly a social practice which cannot be said to partake in the 
process of throughput, in which energy and matter is appropriated, and subsequently emitted 
in a deteriorated form (Foster et al. 2010). As all things have an environmental impact, the 
object of environmental concern is, in principle, everything. It is also in this sense that the 
environmental question differs from ‘social’ struggles. We can use the peace movement to 
demonstrate this point. On the one hand, like the environmental movement, the peace 
movement lacks a clear subject of change: in this regard, it readily lends itself to a consensual 
and cooperative discourse suggesting ‘we should all march together against war’. Yet, on the 
other hand, the peace movement has a precise object or opponent, namely, war and, more 
specifically, the actors engaged in and responsible for war.  The same cannot be so easily said 
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of the environmental question, and therein lies the difference between the peace movement 
and the environmental movement. 
That everything is or can be in principle the object of environmental change could lead 
to the conclusion that an extremely profound transformation is needed, one that embraces 
every human or social practice. In actual contemporary discourses, however, another 
conclusion dominates the scene. In the case of climate change, for example, what one opposes 
first and foremost are not necessarily specific, particularly harmful social practices, let alone 
specific social actors who bear special responsibility for the environmental crisis. Rather, one 
opposes CO2 as such, which is the by-product of almost all thinkable practices (even 
breathing). As a slogan used by the British government aptly summarises, ‘Act on CO2’ 
becomes the motto of this discourse (Urry 2011, p. 90).  
Policy options like emissions trading reinforce this approach, as they equalise all CO2 
emitted, whatever its source (Lohmann 2006): the CO2 emitted by a steel factory is rendered 
equal to that emitted by a hospital, by a wild camel in the remote regions of Australia, or by a 
tree being cut down8. The CO2 emission saved by building more efficient coal-fired power 
stations is equalised with that saved by building windmills. The fact that the latter is a step on 
the pathway to a sustainable energy system while the former remains within the fossil fuel 
model is no longer of any account. Rather than specific social practices or actors that 
especially destabilise the carbon cycle of the planet, which would be clear political choices, 
the object of environmental action is CO2 as such. The result is a discourse of ‘society versus 
CO2’ (Swyngedouw 2007, p. 27). Together with ‘nature’, the ‘enemy’ and every conflict are 
externalised.  
The foregoing seems to lead to an easy conclusion: if we want to repoliticise the 
environmental struggle, not only ‘nature’, but also the ‘enemy’ and conflict should be 
‘internalised’. Indeed, insofar as the environmental crisis is not a crisis of ‘nature’ but a crisis 
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of society and how it relates to its ‘natural’ conditions (Foster et al. 2010), real solutions 
require social change. In other words, we should turn the environmental crisis into a social 
one.  
As already suggested, however, such a move involves certain risks. However 
important it is that the ‘enemy’ is ‘internalised’ and made visible in its social shape, there 
arises a problem if the environmental question is ‘reduced’ to a social one – i.e., if it is 
depicted as merely a struggle between social actors that become political – and seen as a 
normavitely guided, emancipation project.9 While it is crucial to make the antagonisms that 
cut through ‘the people’ and their socially constructed relation with nature visible 
(Swyngedouw 2010a), a problem emerges when the environmental struggle is seen solely as 
the struggle for emancipation of an excluded subject. The voices of the excluded should be 
heard, but we have to make sure not to conceal, in our turn, other kinds of exclusions that 
arise or could arise in the environmental sphere. Indeed, as we will argue below, there is a risk 
that by upholding a normative, emancipatory conception of politicisation, the space of ‘the 
political’ in environmental politics is unduly narrowed down, and we lose sight of other types 
of politicisation that might occur in this field. 
 
Paradoxes 
How, then, can we repoliticise the environmental question without turning it into a mere 
social or normative issue? In order to address this question, let us first try to come to grips 
with a paradox that is present in post-political discourse. Indeed, one could ask the question 
whether a depiction of the present as being profoundly permeated by depoliticisation does not 
tend to be depoliticised itself, in the sense that it remains blind to really existing attempts to 
politicise the environmental sphere. What this means can be illuminated with the help of an 
insight from Schmitt (1996), for whom conflict is the essence of the political. In his book The 
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Concept of the Political, he states that one cannot understand a discourse if one does not know 
whom it is affecting or targeting:  
Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, 
absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are 
incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or 
negated by such a term (Schmitt 1996, p. 30-31).  
Political discourses, he argues, always have a polemical thrust, and their meaning can be truly 
understood only when this polemical dimension is disclosed. Even though certain discourses 
do not refer to a concrete opponent, there is always one, at least implicitly. A humanitarian 
discourse, for example, always entails an implicit reference to something or someone that lies 
outside humanity, to an inhuman being, a radical enemy that has to be crushed (Lievens 
2010). From this perspective, it is possible to engage in a symptomatic reading of typically 
post-political discourses that argue for all-round cooperation and consensus-seeking. From a 
Schmittian perspective, the repeated invocation of the need for consensus would appear 
meaningless if there were not other strategies or discourses that reject consensus-seeking. The 
political meaning of discourses arguing for cooperation can only be revealed by pointing to 
the implicit opponent they aim to polemically affect, namely, discourses that openly advocate 
the need for a more conflictual approach. Discourses stating that the conflict approach is 
obsolete and that we all ought to work together because there is no time to lose in the face of 
climate change are,  in a paradoxical fashion, actually polemical.  
‘There is a war between the ones who say there is a war and the ones who say there 
isn’t,’ Leonard Cohen sang in 1974. This is the kind of conflict that is implicit in many so-
called post-political discourses, which would be utterly meaningless in the absence of this 
(meta-)conflict. It makes perhaps more sense, therefore, to consider post-politics as a type of 
discourse which, despite itself, takes sides and engages in conflict. This conflict is situated on 
a metalevel, but it is a conflict nevertheless. Its opponent is not a particular agent, but the 
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conflict approach as such. The relevance for revealing this metaconflict is that it can provide 
the conditions for politicising supposedly post-political discourses and for moving beyond 
pessimistic diagnoses of post-politics. It enables a kind of reversal of perspectives, through 
which, as a result, we are able to see politicisation as a potentiality within post-politics.10 
After all, even the discourse about the need for consensus against the externalised enemy CO2 
subtly refers to yet another enemy. 
 
Hegemonic struggle 
The critique developed in the previous section opens the door for a repoliticisation of the 
environmental question which does not necessarily require a reference to a particular subject 
and its emancipatory struggle. In this section, we  want to discuss the conditions under which 
this potential can be actualised, and we will show that, given these conditions, the 
environmental question can not only be politicised, but even be the locus of a kind of surplus 
politicisation, without having to reduce politicisation to  a subject-centred emancipation 
process.  
As we have suggested previously, thinking politicisation in terms of the democratic or 
emancipatory struggle of a particular subject can paradoxically lead to forms of 
depoliticisation. However powerful a discourse about the antagonism between the ‘included’ 
and the ‘excluded’ is (Žižek 2008), even here certain exclusions take place from the very 
beginning. From a democratic point of view, it is often and properly argued, for example, that 
women speak with more legitimacy about women’s oppression, and that national or cultural 
minorities are the ones who should wage the struggle against national or cultural 
discrimination. ‘The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working 
classes themselves’, Marx (1864) famously wrote. However emancipatory this principle is, it 
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can also undermine political plurality, and lead to essentialist conclusions, excluding certain 
voices, certain contestations, and certain conflicts from the beginning.  
Since the environmental question lacks an undisputable subject and object of change, 
it is free from at least this particular form of depoliticisation. It seems, therefore, that the 
environmental question is not only a terrain that is easily depoliticised, but in an interesting 
and paradoxical way, also has the potential for a kind of politicisation par excellance. If 
everything can be the object of environmental action, there can be an all-round struggle over 
what ought to be the proper object of this action. Furthermore, if everybody can constitute 
herself as the subject of this question, there is no a priori exclusion of who can or should be 
involved. This potentially allows for the most radical forms of political plurality and 
politicisation imaginable.  
The fact that the environmental question does not have a clear subject or object can 
therefore lead to two conclusions. Predominantly, it is argued that everyone is the subject, so 
everyone should collaborate, and that the externalised phenomenon of ‘CO2’ is the common 
enemy. Paradoxically, however, the fact that everyone could become the subject of 
environmental struggle, and everything could become its object, could also be the condition 
for hegemonic struggle and for politicisation in its most pure form: everyone can appropriate 
the environmental question, give it content, develop its project, and engage in a conflictual 
encounter with others on this basis. Of these two possible conclusions, the first tends to be 
predominant, but nevertheless unstable, representing a kind of political struggle in disguise, 
and therefore in degenerated, depoliticised form. As we have seen, the first position is easily 
deconstructed: polemic appears as a crucial dimension in even the most consensual 
discourses. 
The crucial question is what could facilitate the realisation of the second possibility. 
Or in other words, what are the conditions for letting the seeds of politicisation present in 
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post-political environmental discourses germinate and blossom? Since we want to avoid the 
need to refer to subjects and emancipatory causes, we think the way discourses deal with 
‘nature’ or the ‘environment’ as their referent is key. Using the analytic tools that Mouffe and 
Laclau (2001) developed to understand hegemonic struggle, it could be stated that the crucial 
condition for genuine politicisation is that the concept of ‘nature’ is tendentially emptied. 
Only in this way can it be appropriated by the greatest variety of subjects for the most varied 
of political goals. As elaborated above, ‘nature’ is a slippery concept, whose boundaries are 
extremely difficult to demarcate (Castree 2005). Yet exactly this slipperiness could, under 
certain conditions, contribute to the radical contestability of environmental discourses, and, 
therefore, to the politicisation of the environmental question. Indeed, the potential for 
politicisation is dependent upon the degree of contingency that is discursively left open, since 
only in this way can a radically open space for conflict and contestation manifest itself. 
Tendentially emptying the signifier ‘nature’ makes it possible for a plurality of political actors 
to appropriate and integrate the concept according to their own respective discourse. 
In the domain of the environmental question, ‘struggle’ could thus take the form of 
choosing for ‘a’ nature. By ‘a’ nature, we mean any one of the senses ‘nature’ has acquired in 
the different discourses. One could choose for the nature upheld by advocates of genetic 
modification as a technology to deal with environmental problems such as drought or heat, 
over and against the nature advocated by proponents of agro-ecology; the nature of emission 
trading, which equalises everything (activities of steel factories, universities, hospitals) under 
a common denominator (CO2), over and against the nature of environmentalists stressing 
qualitative differences and social priorities concerning where emissions should first be cut; 
the nature of advocates of original biodiversity against the nature of those who think that 
biodiversity losses can be ‘offsetted’. The choice for any ‘nature’ inevitably entails the 
exclusion of other possibilities, and on this basis, generates antagonisms. Therefore, bringing 
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choice and decision to the fore could be the starting point for genuine attempts to repoliticise 
the environmental question.  
We thus obtain a visible scene composed of a plurality of positions that does not 
require a normative-leaning discourse on emancipation, but is nevertheless thoroughly 
political. On such a terrain, exclusions and antagonisms can become visible and hegemonic 
struggle can manifest itself. As referred to above, Ernesto Laclau (1996) has argued that 
politicisation happens when a series of demands are equivalentially connected in a 
counterhegemonic discourse. In other words, politicisation occurs when one signifier comes to 
stand for the whole, expressing these demands and becoming tendentially empty as a result. 
To demonstrate his point, Laclau gives two the examples: ‘solidarity’, in the context of the 
Polish movement against the communist bureaucrats in the eighties; and the notion of the 
‘people’ in populism (Laclau 2005). Each time, the signifier that is thus turned into the nodal 
point of the whole chain of equivalence – e.g., ‘solidarity’ or ‘the people’- becomes 
tendentially empty. Furthermore, such empty signifiers can also be reappropriated by other 
hegemonic discourses and, consequently, become floating signifiers (Butler et al. 2000, p. 
305). Obvious examples of this are provided by such notions as liberty and equality, which 
have been the objects of democratic hegemonic struggle par excellance, as all types of 
political forces have tried, and sometimes succeeded,  to appropriate and resignify them 
(Mouffe 2000). They have become both empty and floating signifiers as a result.  
It could be argued that something similar has happened historically to the signifier 
‘nature’. As Swyngedouw affirms: ‘This emptying out of a fixed meaning of Nature has been 
a systematic feature of late modernity, particularly as signifying chains of what Nature 
‘really’ is multiplied in parallel to the proliferation of socio-political, cultural or other 
differentiations’ (Swyngedouw 2010b, p. 305). Different ideological and political currents 
have used the signifier ‘nature’ as a nodal point in their discourse, thus emptying it and 
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making it less saturated with meaning. The more this takes place, the more such a signifier 
becomes the possible object of a hegemonic struggle, which is about reappropriating it and 
giving it a new meaning. The new meaning ‘nature’ acquires – or any signifier of this kind -  
can be fully sutured only to the extent that there are no longer political differentiations in the 
way it is reappropriated and resignified. 
In a certain way, therefore, politicisation establishes its own conditions of possibility, 
although, as we have seen, the potential for politicisation is already present in the polemic 
thrust of even the most consensus-oriented discourse. It is by opening a conflict and 
reappropriating and resignifying ‘nature’ that the signifier ‘nature’ is tendentially emptied. 
This can seem paradoxical or circular, but this circularity is not uncommon in political and 
democratic theory, and has very practical consequences. Since politicisation happens as an 
event, and generates in this way its own conditions of possibility, theory can articulate and 
think through what happens, but it can never establish these conditions exhaustively through 
mere theoretical means. However useful Žižek’s (2009a, p. 442) provocative statement, 
‘nature does not exist’, repoliticisation cannot consist of mere theoretical argumentation that 
criticises post-politics and deconstructs the concept of nature, showing its inherent instability. 
There is no solution to post-politics that is solely theoretical and conceptual. An intervention 
in the ideological and political struggle in the public sphere, through which the signifier of 
‘nature’ is reappropriated and resignified, is required. Fighting against and going beyond post-
politics inevitably requires a political act.  
 
Conclusion 
This article began by outlining three interrelated problems. First, we showed that, to a certain 
extent, ‘the political’ indeed seems to be lost in environmental politics today. Not only does 
the environmental ‘struggle’ often appear depoliticised, but there is also a lack of clarity about 
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what we mean exactly when we talk about ‘the political’ in environmental politics. The 
purpose of this article was to recover the political dimension in environmental politics and to 
endeavour to conceptualise it.  
Second, we attempted to grasp the reason why the environmental question is more 
easily depoliticised than other important issues. We showed, how both the lack of a clear 
subject and object and the tendency to externalise ‘nature’ contribute to this and often lead to 
the conclusion that we should all work together against the common, externalised enemy 
‘CO2’.  
On these grounds, a potential pathway towards repoliticisation could consist of 
‘internalising’ nature, or in other words, recognising the contingent social structures and 
corresponding power relations underlying environmental destruction. In a genuinely 
emancipatory fashion, the ‘excluded’ could raise their voices and demand equality. However 
essential it is to acknowledge that the environmental crisis is not a crisis of ‘nature’ but of 
society, and that effective and democratic solutions therefore require social change, focusing 
exclusively on oppressed subject positions and their emancipatory struggle risks missing the 
full complexity of what it means to repoliticise the environmental question. Such moves tend 
to narrow the scope of what politicisation could consist of, and thus unduly reduce its 
contingency, as environmental struggle is then, from the very beginning, instilled with a 
certain normative content. In order to gain a more sober understanding of ‘the political’ and 
take its non-normative dimension seriously, we tried to recover the conflictual dimension that 
is present in every discourse, even the most post-political one. The meta-diagnosis we 
undertook in the fourth section reveals that beneath even the most depoliticised discourse a 
hegemonic struggle takes place: a struggle that concerns the very place conflict and plurality 
is allowed to inhabit. In the last section, we argued that precisely the lack of a clear subject 
and object can, under certain conditions, turn the environmental question into the terrain of 
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politicisation par excellance: the political is then understood not in normative terms, but as a 
space where plurality, conflict and power can become visible and contestable as such.  
  
                                                          
Notes:  
1
 Tony Blair's conference speech 2005, The Guardian, 27 September 2005.  
2
 For a report of the conference, see http://www.economischegroei.net/file/76 
3
 The sentence, ‘where is the political,’ is borrowed from Erik Swyngedouw (2009b) who elaborated 
on this topic in the domain of geography.  
4
 As is well-known, some controversy surrounds the figure of Carl Schmitt. Many authors are 
understandably reluctant to draw upon his work, given the fact that he allied himself with Nazism in 
the thirties. However, a number of contemporary political theorists have engaged in very selective and 
creative readings of his work, singling out particular insights which are still relevant today, cf. Mouffe, 
C., 2006. On the Political. London: Routledge, Kalyvas, A. 1999. Review Essay: Who's afraid of Carl 
Schmitt? Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(5), 87-125, Kalyvas, A., 2008. Democracy and the 
Politics of the Extraordinary. Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt. . Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, Mouffe, C., 1999. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt. London: Verso.  
5
 It is of course debatable whether it is ever possible to totally exclude subjectivity from science or 
morality. One could argue that science and morality are always political in a certain sense, even if this 
is not explicitly acknowledged. However, there is of course an evident difference between science and 
morality on the one hand, and political action in the proper sense of the word, on the other.  
6
 Of course, some social groups are more exposed to the consequences of environmental destruction 
than others, and some bear greater responsibility than others. Yet, in principal, all somehow contribute 
to the production of waste, and all are at least potential victims of large-scale environmental 
catastrophes. 
7
 We thank Gareth Dale for his inspiring input during a seminar in Leuven on this issue. 
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8In Australia, the government has set up a programme to shoot wild camels in order to reduce methane 
emissions.  
9
 Erik Swyngedouw strongly warns against the reduction of the political to the social, but at the same 
time he follows the Rancierian approach to repoliticisation and, as a result, also tends to end up with a 
form of emancipatory apriorism. 
10
 This reversal could be compared to what several post-Marxist or post-Foucauldian approaches 
pursue when they try to show that there is resistance in each exercise of power (E.g. Proust 1997; 
Negri and Hardt 2000). 
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